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Social security and public health have been two key concerns of many societies because 
of their possible important impacts on economic growth, population growth, and welfare. 
In  fact,  most  of  the  developed  nations  have  instituted  pay-as-you-go  (PAYG)  social 
security and public health programs for several decades (see, e.g., Aaron, 1985; Lee and 
Tuljapurkar, 1997). At the same time, these countries have observed dramatic increases 
in life expectancy and significant declines in fertility, leading to rapid population aging. 
In OECD countries,  total fertility rates have declined dramatically from an average 2.7 in 
1970 to 1.7 in 2008, while life expectancy at birth has increased by more than 10 years 
since 1960, reaching 79.1 in 2007 (OECD, 2010a, 2010b). Government expenditure on 
social security and public health, therefore, increased substantially in tandem with the 
population aging.  
  Indeed, the gross public social expenditure on average across the OECD countries 
has increased from 16% of GDP in 1980 to 19% in 2007, of which public pensions and 
public health expenditures were over 7% and 6.4 % of GDP respectively (OECD, 2010c). 
By contrast, private health spending accounted only for about 2.6% of GDP on average 
across the OECD countries in 2008 (OECD, 2010d). In the United States, for example, 
there were upward trends in the ratio of public to private health expenditure and in life 
expectancy in the time series data for the period 1870-2000 as noted in Tang and Zhang 
(2007). These patterns suggest that increases in social security and public health may be 
closely  linked  to  declines  in  fertility  and  increases  in  life  expectancy  in  developed 
countries.  
The steady population aging has caused serious concerns about future economic 
growth, the pressure on funding social security and public health care, and the wellbeing 
of a greyer population. A particular challenge is: increasing spending on social security 
and public health may increase longevity and reduce fertility further, but the resultant 
increase in population aging may in turn call for more spending on social security and 
public health. The welfare consequence of the challenge may depend largely on how such 
policies affect capital accumulation and economic growth. Therefore, it is important and 
relevant to explore the implications of PAYG social security and public health together 
for fertility, life expectancy, capital accumulation, economic growth and welfare.   
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  We  will  carry  out  this  task  in  a  dynastic  model  of  neoclassical  growth  with 
altruistic  bequests,  endogenous  fertility,  endogenous  longevity,  and  actuarially  fair 
annuity markets. In our model, longevity depends positively on per worker public health 
spending. A rise in the tax rate for social security in our model has opposing effects on 
fertility and capital intensity, and hence on longevity. On the one hand, by increasing the 
bequest cost of having a child, the tax rise tends to reduce fertility  and raise capital 
intensity  and  longevity.  On  the  other  hand,  by  reducing  the  after-tax  wage  rate,  the 
opportunity cost of spending time rearing a child falls and hence, the tax rise tends to 
increase fertility and reduce capital intensity and longevity. Moreover, under a system 
that  links  social  security  benefits  to  earnings,  the  forgone  social  security  benefits  of 
spending time rearing a child rises with the tax rate, thereby adding to the cost of a child 
to channel a negative effect of social security on fertility and a positive effect on capital 
intensity and longevity.  
A rise in  the tax rate for  public health  care  also  exerts conflicting  effects  on 
fertility, capital intensity, and longevity. On the one hand, when the tax rate for public 
health increases, the time cost of spending time rearing a child falls and thus fertility may 
rise and capital intensity and longevity may fall. When higher public health spending 
drives up longevity on the other hand, agents may shift their focus from the number of 
children and middle-age consumption toward old-age consumption, thereby tending to 
reduce fertility and raise capital intensity (and hence, to raise longevity further).  
Our main finding is that the net effect of a tax rise for social security or for public 
health on fertility will depend on the taste for the number, relative to the welfare, of 
children. A stronger taste for the welfare of children tends to strengthen the negative 
effect on fertility and the positive effects on longevity and capital intensity. When the 
taste for the welfare of children is not weaker than the taste for the number of children, 
social security and public health reduce fertility and thus raise capital intensity, output per 
worker, and longevity, as long as the productivity parameter is large enough. Under the 
same condition, increasing social security increases public health spending per worker 
and vice versa. It is also important to compare the magnitudes of these effects between 
social  security  and  public  health.  In  this  comparison,  social  security  has  a  stronger  
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positive effect on capital intensity and a stronger negative effect on fertility than public 
health does, other things being equal.    
  When the tax rate rises, the opposite movements of fertility on the one hand and 
capital intensity and longevity on the other hand inevitably affect welfare. A reduction in 
fertility reduces welfare as households obtain utility from the number of children. The 
welfare loss of falling fertility is increasing with the tax rate at the margin. However, an 
increase  in  capital  intensity  increases  labor  productivity  and  welfare.  An  increase  in 
longevity also increases welfare. The welfare gains of rising capital intensity and rising 
longevity  are  decreasing  with  the tax  rate  at  the  margin.  The  net  welfare  effect  will 
depend on the relative strength of the tastes for the welfare and number of children and 
on the tax rate. We illustrate numerically that when the taste for the welfare of children is 
not weaker than the taste for the number of children, social security and public health can 
be welfare enhancing before reaching an optimal scale by reducing fertility and raising 
capital intensity and longevity as long as the productivity parameter is large enough. 
When the tax rate is beyond the optimal scale, a further increase in the tax rate for social 
security and public health will reduce welfare.  
  By a numerical comparison for plausible parameterizations, public health obtains 
a higher welfare level than social security when using them separately. When public 
health is used alone, its welfare-improving role works through the channels of fertility, 
capital intensity and longevity, but when social security is used alone instead, its welfare-
improving role works through only the first two channels when public health is absent. 
However, since public health has weaker effects on fertility and capital intensity than 
social security does, other things being equal, using them together achieves even higher 
welfare. The optimal tax rates for social  security and public health in  our numerical 
example with plausible parameterizations are close to their realistic values in developed 
countries.  
  Due to the complexity of the model, most of our analysis and results focus on the 
steady state. Therefore, our optimal social security and public health should be associated 
with the notion of the "modified golden rule" in the literature on neoclassical growth. 
Since the model does not possess an analytical solution for the dynamic path, we shall 
use the linearization approach to approximate the solution to this non-linear dynamic  
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general equilibrium model. Our numerical result shows that in the linearized model there 
exists a unique convergent path leading to the steady state. 
Our model differs from a large body of related literature.  For example, many 
study social security or the consequences of rising longevity  by assuming exogenous 
longevity. Among them, Samuelson (1958), Diamond (1965), Barro (1974), Feldstein 
(1974),  Hubbard  and  Judd  (1987),  Zhang  (1995),  Rosati  (1996),  and  Corneo  and 
Marquardt (2000) investigate the impact of social security on savings. Kaganovich and 
Zilcha (1999), Cooley and Soares (1999), Zhang and Zhang (2007), and Yew and Zhang 
(2009) study the welfare implications of social security. Zhang (1995), Sanchez-Losada 
(2000), and Kemnitz and Wigger (2000) show that with human and physical  capital, 
social security can promote growth, which is consistent with the empirical evidence in 
Zhang  and  Zhang  (2004)  that  social  security  has  positive  effects  on  human  capital 
investment and on the growth rate of per capita income. Ehrlich and Lui (1991), Hu 
(1999), de la Croix and Licandro (1999), and Zhang and Zhang (2001) conclude that 
higher life expectancy increases the rate of return to human capital investment and leads 
to higher human capital investment and faster per capita growth. Barro (1997) and Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1995) find empirical evidence that life expectancy has a positive effect 
on economic growth when income is low, and that the growth effect fades away when 
income is high. Zhang, Zhang and Lee (2001) show that a rise in longevity tends to 
reduce fertility and increase human capital investment and growth in a dynastic family 
model with social security in line with the empirical evidence in Zhang and Zhang (2005).  
 Some empirical studies provide evidence against the hypothesis of exogenous 
longevity. For instance, Preston (1975) empirically shows that in aggregate data average 
income  contributes  positively  to  life  expectancy.  Focusing  on  developing  countries, 
Anand and Ravallion (1993) find considerable cross-country evidence that the positive 
relationship between life expectancy and income per capita works mainly via the impact 
of  income  on  public  health  spending.  More  recently,  Lichtenberg  (2004)  provides 
empirical evidence that public health expenditure contributed to higher longevity in the 
U.S.  during  the  period  1960-2001.  According  to  the  observed  stylized  facts,  the 
inclusions of life expectancy as an endogenous variable and its positive association with  
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public health expenditure in a model of income growth are highly relevant in the analysis 
of social security.  
Though  there  are  studies  that  consider  endogenous  longevity,  these  studies 
usually do not consider social security at the same time. For instance, Ehrlich and Chuma 
(1990)  concern  the  role  of  endowed  wealth,  health,  and  other  initial  conditions  in 
determining the demand for health and longevity, among others. Blackburn and Cipriani 
(2002)  combine  endogenous  fertility  and  longevity  to  explain  multiple  development 
regimes.  Leung,  Zhang  and  Zhang  (2004)  consider  gender-specific  factors  in  the 
determination of longevity. Chakraborty and Das (2005)  show that in  the absence of 
perfect  annuities  markets,  the  interplay  between  income  and  mortality  can  generate 
poverty traps by assuming a positive relationship between the probability of survival and 
private health investment. Tang and Zhang (2007) investigate health investment, human 
capital investment, and life cycle savings and show that subsidies on health and human 
capital investment can improve welfare. Most of them assume non-altruistic preferences 
and thus would have different policy implications from our altruistic model. 
There are a few exceptions that model endogenous longevity in the studies on 
social security and health. Davies and Kuhn (1992) consider the intake of health related 
goods that endogenously affect longevity and show that a social security system would 
encourage suboptimal health investment, leading to excessive longevity, in the presence 
of a moral hazard problem. Philipson and Becker (1998) consider longevity under the 
influence of public programs, such as health care and social insurance and pointed out 
that all forms of old-age income annuity, such as private life insurance or social security 
programs, would have a similar effect on life prolongation. By analyzing the relationships 
between life-cycle saving and health investments in different stages of life, Zhang, Zhang 
and Leung (2006) show that public pensions and health subsidies tend to retard capital 
accumulation but may improve life expectancy and welfare. However, these studies have 
ignored the combination of such important factors as altruistic intergenerational transfers 
and endogenous fertility that may lead to very different results.  
Overall,  our  joint  consideration  of  social  security  and  public  health  in  a  rich 
neoclassical growth model with endogenous longevity and endogenous fertility has not 
only empirical relevance but also advantages in the analysis of their effects. In particular,  
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it allows us to compare the relative strengths of social security and public health across 
cases when they are used separately or jointly in terms of their effects on capital intensity, 
fertility, longevity, and welfare. The joint consideration also allows us to achieve higher 
welfare than those when focusing on just one of them.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. 
Section 3 provides analytical and numerical results.  Section 4 concludes.   
 
2. The model 
Time is discrete in this model, extending from period 0 to infinity ( 0,1,..., t  ). The 
model economy is inhabited by overlapping generations of a large number of identical 
agents who live for three periods. In the first period of life, agents do not make any 
decision.  In  their  second  period  of  life, they  work  and  make  decisions  on  life-cycle 
savings,  the  number  of  children,  the  amount  of  bequests  to  children  and  their  own 
consumption; they retire when old. Survival is certain from childhood through middle-
age, but each middle-aged agent faces a probability  (0,1) p  to survive to old age.  
    The utility function of a middle-aged agent,  t V , is defined over own middle-age 
consumption,  t cR   ,  own  old-age  consumption,  1 t dR   ,  the  number  of  children, 
t nR   , and the utility of each identical child,  1 t V  :
1 
    11 ln ln ln , , , (0,1), 0 t t t t t t V c p d n V                                    (1) 
where  is the discounting factor,    is the taste for utility derived from own old-age 
consumption,  and  is  the  taste  for  utility derived  from  the  number  of  children.  We 
assume that the survival rate is increasing in public health spending per worker,  t MR   , 




t p a a e  , where  0, 1, 2 0 1 0;1 a a a a a    .
2 The assumption of 
a logarithmic utility function helps to ensure tractability. 
  In period t, a middle-aged agent devotes  t vn  units of time endowment to rearing 
children  where  01 v is  fixed.  The  remaining(1 ) t vn   units  of  time  are  devoted  to 
                                                 
1 Our use of an altruistic model is consistent with some of the existing empirical evidence. See Tomes 
(1981), Laitner and Juster (1996), and Laitner and Ohlsson (2001), for instance. 
2 The assumption that the survival rate is increasing in public health expenditure is consistent with 
empirical evidence in Lichtenberg (2004) as mentioned earlier.  
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working  that  earns  (1 )(1 )
TM
t t t t vn w      where  t wR   is  the  wage  rate  per  unit  of 
labor,  1
T    is the contribution rate for social security, and  1
M    is the tax rate for 
public  health.  This  agent  receives  a  bequest  t b  with  earned  interest  t rR   ,  (1 ) tt br  , 
from his or her old parent at the beginning of  period t, and leaves a bequest,  1 t bR   , to 
each child at the end of period t so that children receive bequests regardless of their 
parents’ survival status at old age. He or she spends the earnings and the received bequest 
with  earned  interest  on  own  middle-age  consumption,  t c ,  retirement  savings  via 
actuarially  fair annuity  markets  t sR   , and bequests to children 1 tt bn  . An old agent 
spends his or her savings plus interest income and social security benefits on own 
consumption,  1 t d  . The budget constraints can be written as: 
     1 (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ,
TM
t t t t t t t t t t c b r vn w s b n                                                           (2)            
       1 1 1 (1 ) / t t t t t d r s p T       ,                                                                                     (3)            
where  1 t TR   is the amount of social security benefits per retiree.   
    As practiced in many countries such as France and Germany, the amount of social 
security benefits received by a retiree depends on his or her own earnings in working age 
according to a replacement rate .  The government budget constraints are given by  
  1 1 1 1 (1 ) (1 ) /
T
t t t t t t t t t t T vn w n vn w p          , 
  (1 )
M
t t t t M vn w    
where  the bar above  a  variable indicates  its  average  level  in  the economy.
 With this 
formula  linking  the  amount  of  one’s  social  security  benefits  to  his  or  her  own  past 
earnings, a worker who has more children (hence more time for rearing children and less 
time for working) will not only earn less wage income today but also receive less social 
security benefits in old age.  With identical agents in the same generation, in equilibrium 
we have  ;; n n p p M M     by symmetry. In this model, we focus on public healthcare 
systems that are available in many industrial nations. 
   The production of the single final good is 
   
1 (1 ) , 0, (0,1), 0,1 t t t t Y AK vn K A
     
                   (4)  
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where  t YR    and t KR   are  output  per  worker  and  physical  capital  per  worker, 
respectively;  A is  the total factor productivity parameter,   is  the  share  parameter of 
capital, and   measures the strength of spillovers from average capital per worker t K . 
Since one period in this model corresponds to about 30 years, it is reasonable to assume 
that  physical  capital  depreciates  fully  within  one  period.  When  0   ,  there  is  no 
externality  from  average  physical  capital  in  this  model.  However,  when  0   ,  the 
externality  takes  the  form  of  positive  spillovers  from  average physical  capital  to  the 
production of the final good.
 3 However, the exact degree of this externality is unclear. 
When  1  , the externality is strong enough to generate endogenous growth in an 
AK-style model. However, Jones (1995), using time series data in OECD countries, finds 
empirical evidence against this AK-type model. Moreover, an AK-style model has been 
criticized based on the empirical evidence on convergence (see, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995, 2004). We therefore limit our attention to 10     . 
    Factors are paid by their marginal products; and the price of the sole final good is 
normalized to unity. The wage rate per unit of labor and the real interest factor are then 
given by  
         (1 ) /(1 ), t t t w Y vn                                                                                                 (5)          
        1/ t t t r Y K   ,                                                                                                        (6) 
The physical capital market clears when  
           11 /. t t t t t K s b n n                                                                                                (7)           
 
3. The equilibrium and results 
We now solve the dynastic family’s problem and track down the equilibrium allocation. 
The  problem  of  a  dynastic  family  is  to  maximize  utility  in  (1)  subject  to  budget 
constraints (2) and (3), knowing the earnings dependent benefit formula, and taking the 
prices, the probability to survive to old age, the taxes and replacement rates as given. This 
problem can be rewritten as the following: 
                                                 
3 The investment externality has been emphasized in the literature on economic growth (e.g. Arrow, 1962; 
Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1993). Based on cross-country data, DeLong and Summers (1991) argued that the 
spillovers from equipment investment are very substantial. See also Bernstein and Nadiri (1988, 1989), and 








{ln[ (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ] max
ln[(1 ) / (1 ) ] ln }
t t t
t T M
t t t t t t t t t
b n s t
t t t t t t t t
b r vn w s b n








       
   
  
where we have used the budget constraints and the earnings dependent benefit formula 
































 ,                                                                                               (9) 






t t t t t t t
t
t t t
vw b p vw
n
c d n
     

  
 .                     (10) 
   
In (8), the marginal loss in utility from giving a bequest to each child is equal to 
the marginal gain in children’s utility. In (9), the marginal loss in utility from saving is 
equal to the marginal gain in utility in old age through receiving the return to saving.  
Such public policies do not create wedges in the intertemporal conditions with respect to 
bequests  and  lifecycle  savings.  In  (10),  the  marginal  loss  in  utility  from  having  an 
additional child, through  forgoing a  fraction of wage income and earnings-dependent 
social security benefits and leaving a bequest to this child, is equal to the marginal gain in 
utility from enjoying the child. In (10), increasing the tax rates for public health and 
social security will reduce the forgone after-tax wage cost of a child but raise the forgone 
pension benefit cost of a child via  t p and  1 t   , respectively. We thus expect  that social 
security and public health will affect the allocations via fertility: without the choice of 
fertility, social security would be neutral   overall  and  public health  would be neutral 
towards capital intensity  and output per w orker  although it would  still  affect life 
expectancy. These first-order conditions hold for all t ≥ 0. 
  The equilibrium of the economy is described below.  
 
Definition. Given an initial state ( 1 1 0 ,, s n b  ), a competitive equilibrium in the economy 
with  PAYG  social  security  and  public  health  is  a  sequence  of  allocations  
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  1 1 1 1 0 , , , , , , , , , , , ,
TM
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t b c d K n s T M p Y   

     and  prices    0 1, tt t rw

  such  that  (i) 
taking  prices  and  government  policies    1 0 , , , ,
TM
t t t t t t MT   

  as  given,  firms  and 
households optimize and their solutions are feasible, (ii) the  government budgets are 
balanced  in every perio d, (iii) all markets clear with    11 / t t t t t K s b n n    and  per 
worker labor being equal to(1 ) t vn  , and (iv)  ;; n n p p M M     by symmetry.  
 
Specifically, these equilibrium conditions correspond to the first-order conditions 
of firms and households, the budget constraints of households and the government, the 
production technology, the capital market clearing condition, and the amount of labor 
supply per worker equal to(1 ) t vn  , for t ≥ 0. In addition, as mentioned earlier, we have 
;; n n p p M M     in equilibrium by symmetry. Because the model is too complex to 
be tractable for its full dynamic path, we will mainly focus on the analysis of the steady 
state equilibrium. In what follows, we first characterize the steady state equilibrium and 
investigate  the  implication  of  social  security  and  public  health  for  fertility,  capital 
intensity,  longevity  and  welfare  at  the  steady  state.  We  then  use  the  linearization 
approach  to  approximate  the  solution  to  our  model,  as  the  model  cannot  be  solved 
analytically. 
 
3.1. Analysis of the steady state equilibrium 
3.1.1. The implications of social security and public health for fertility, life expectancy, 
capital per worker, and output per worker 
Since labor income is a constant fraction,(1 )   , of output per worker in this model, let 
us  define /(1 ) c t t t c vn w   ,  11 /(1 )(1 ) d t t t t d r vn w      ,  1 /(1 ) b t t t t b n vn w    ,  and 
/(1 ) s t t t s vn w   for convenience. We use them to transform variables in the budget 
constraints and first-order conditions into their relative ratios to labor income in order to 







    
  
     





















,                                                                                                     (13)                                                                                                         
  cd    ,                                                                                                               (14) 
 
(1 )





vn n vn n





.                                                                   (15) 
 
Equation  (15)  can  be  derived  by  using 1 1 1 1/ t t t r Y K      , 
where   1 1 1 1 1 (1 ) /(1 ), and  / t t t t t t t t Y vn w K s b n n            .  The  left-hand  side  of  (15) 
contains three cost components of a child. The first cost component is the forgone wage 
income of spending time rearing a child, which falls with the tax rates for social security 
or public health other things being equal. Higher tax rates for social security and public 
health may also reduce the ratio of middle-age consumption to output, through which 
social security and public health spending may indirectly increase all the cost components 
of having a child according to (15). Formal results will be given later. 
The second cost component is the bequest cost of a child, which should rise with 
the tax rates for social security but may rise or fall with the tax rates for public health. 
When the tax rate for social security increases, altruistic parents are tempted to reduce the 
tax burdens of social security on their children by leaving more bequests to them, and 
thus higher tax rates for social security increase the bequest cost of a child and tend to 
reduce fertility. When the tax rate for public health increases, the provision of public 
health per worker increases and hence, life expectancy increases, for any fertility level. 
With higher life expectancy, the annuity income from private savings and social security 
benefits will fall, other things being equal, so that agents have stronger incentives to save 
more for their old-age consumption and reduce bequests and middle-age consumption. 
However, altruistic parents, who expect their children to live longer as well, are tempted 
to  leave  more  bequests  for  their  children’s  old-age  consumption,  thereby  tending  to 
reduce their life-cycle savings and increase the amount of bequests. Hence, when a rise in 
the tax rate for public health drives up life expectancy, agents may shift focus from the  
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number of children and their middle-age consumption toward either their own old-age 
consumption or children’s old-age consumption and thus, fertility may fall.  
The third cost component is the forgone social security benefit of spending time 
rearing  a  child.  It  increases  with  the  tax  rate  for  social  security  through  the  linkage 
between the replacement rate and the tax rate for social security under a balanced social 
security budget. 
Overall, when the tax rate for social security rises, the subsequent rise in the third 
cost component partially offsets the fall in the first cost component, and the total time 
cost of having a child is likely to fall. However, the possible rise in the bequest cost of a 
child due to higher tax rates for social security may reduce fertility. When the tax rate for 
public health rises, a fall in the time cost of having a child also tends to increase fertility 
but the subsequent rise in life expectancy tends to reduce fertility via a possible reduction 
in middle-age consumption.  
The  net  effect  of  social  security  on  fertility  will  depend  on  the  taste  for  the 
number, relative to the welfare, of children. When the taste for the welfare of every 
child, , becomes stronger, the third cost component of a child in (15) becomes larger 
and hence it is more likely that social security reduces fertility. By contrast, when the 
taste for the number of children,, becomes stronger, the marginal benefit of a child 
becomes larger and hence it is more likely for a rise in the tax rate for social security to 
raise fertility. This is similar to Zhang and Zhang (2007) where survival is certain. 
What is new here is that the net effect of public health on fertility also depends on 
the  taste  for  the  number,  relative  to  the  welfare,  of  children.  When  the  taste  for  the 
welfare of children becomes stronger relative to that for the number of children, it is more 
likely that public health may reduce fertility. In addition, the net effect of public health 
also depends on the productivity parameter  A. When the productivity parameter is larger, 
average public health spending is greater for any positive 
M  , and therefore it is more 
likely that public health may raise life expectancy and reduce fertility. We now establish 
the results in the steady state. From these equilibrium conditions, we obtain the following 
steady-state allocation rules:  
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where the numerator of n is  
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Note  that  life  expectancy ( , )
TM p   is  a  constant  function  in  the  steady  state 
equilibrium: 
2 ( , )
01 ( , ) /
TM aM TM p a a e
    where M is a function of   and 
TM  via n in 
(19): 
1 1 ( ) 1 1 ( ) ( , ) (1 ) (1 )
T M M M A vn
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   
   

          
.  
We can easily observe that if  n n >0 then fertility n is positive in (19). However, 
since the log utility function excludes corner solutions for fertility, the presence of non-
convexity in the form of  1 tt bn   in the budget constraint  (2) may lead to a situation in 
which there is no solution for fertility for some parameter values. As shown in Zhang et 
al. (2001) and Zhang (1995), the sufficient condition for the solution to be optimal is a 
sufficiently large taste parameter for the number of children ( ) such that an interior 
solution  for  fertility  exists.  In  order  to  obtain  positive  fertility   in  (19),  we 
assume 01 [ ( )(1 )]/(1 ) aa               .  Further,  we  assume  a  strong  
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enough  taste  for  the  welfare  of  children  (  )  such  that  bequests  are  positive: 
    0 1 0 1 [ ( )(1 )]/ 1 ( ) a a a a            . 
4  
 
Now, we investigate the impact of rises in tax rates for social security and public 
health on the fractions of middle-age earnings spent on savings and bequests. 
 
Proposition 1. A rise in the tax rate for unfunded social security, 
T  , or for public health, 
M  , has no effect on the fraction of middle-age earnings spent on the sum of savings and 
bequests() sb   .  
 
Proof. This is obvious in equation (13).   
 
A rise in the tax rate for social security has the following effects on bequests and 
savings: a higher tax rate for social security increases the burden of children in paying 
higher social security contributions and hence, altruistic parents leave more bequests to 
children as in Barro (1974) and Zhang (1995). At the same time, parents expect to receive 
higher social security benefits and therefore, they tend to save less such that the fraction 
of middle-age earnings spent on the sum of savings and bequests() sb    is unaffected 
by social security. On the other hand, when the tax rate for public health increases, life 
expectancy increases, thereby reducing annuity incomes from savings and social security. 
Thus, agents may either save more for their old-age consumption and leave less bequests 
to their children at the same time, or do the opposite. By doing so, the fraction of middle-
age earnings spent on the sum of savings and bequests () sb    is unaffected by the tax 
rate for public health. This differs from the result in lifecycle models without altruistic 
bequests. For example, public health spending increases lifecycle savings and accelerates 
capital accumulation in Tang and Zhang (2007) without bequests. 
  We  now  investigate  how  fertility,  capital  per  worker  and  output  per  worker 
respond to rises in tax rates for unfunded social security and public health: 
                                                 
4 Kotlikoff  and  Summers  (1981)  find  empirical  evidence  that  bequests  are  an  important  element  in 




Proposition 2. If   , then a rise in the tax rate for unfunded social security, 
T  , 
reduces fertility, raises capital per worker, and raises output per worker. If   and  A 
is large enough, then a rise in the tax rate for public health, 
M  , reduces fertility, raises 
capital per worker, and raises output per worker.  
 
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix A.  
 
As discussed earlier, with a stronger taste for the welfare of children, it is more 
likely that the tax rise reduces fertility and leads to a rise in both capital and output per 
worker.  When  a  rise  in  the  tax  rate  for  social  security  reduces  fertility  under    
without any effect on the ratio of savings and bequests to output in Proposition 1, it must 
increase capital and output per worker. This extends a similar result in Zhang and Zhang 
(2007) to be applicable to a model with endogenous longevity. The negative effect of 
social security is consistent with the empirical finding in the literature (e.g. see Zhang and 
Zhang,  2004,  and  some  other  papers  cited  therein).  So  we  regard  the  condition  in 
Proposition 2 as empirically plausible.  
   The new finding in Proposition 2 is: when the taste for the welfare of children is 
not weaker than the taste for the number of children,   , and when the productivity 
parameter,  A, is large enough, a rise in the tax rate for public health reduces fertility and 
thus raises capital and output per worker.
5 Intuitively, with a stronger taste for the welfare 
of children and with a larger productivity parameter, the negative effect of public health 
spending on fertility via a rise in life expectancy (to be established next) is more likely to 
outweigh the positive effect of public health on  fertility via a fall in the time cost of 
spending time rearing a child.   
  Let us now investigate the effects of a rise in the tax rates for social security and 
public health on the provision of public health per worker, life expectancy, the ratio of 
middle-age consumption to income and the ratio of old-age consumption to income. 
                                                 
5 This relationship between fertility and output per worker accords well with the empirical evidence that 
fertility is negatively related to output per worker, except, perhaps, at very low levels of income (see, e.g., 




Proposition  3.  If   and  0
M   ,  then  a  rise  in  the  tax  rate  for  unfunded  social 
security, 
T  , raises  public health spending per worker, raises life expectancy, reduces 
the  ratio  of  middle-age  consumption  to  income,  and  reduces  the  ratio  of  old-age 
consumption to income.  If    and  A is large enough, then a rise in the tax rate for 
public  health, 
M  ,  raises  public  health  spending  per  worker,  raises  life  expectancy, 
reduces the ratio of middle-age consumption to income, and reduces the ratio of old-age 
consumption to income .  
 
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix A. 
 
 In the conventional dynastic model without health spending, social security is 
neutral with regard to consumption pattern over life stages via saving, which is well 
known as the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis (Barro, 1974; Zhang, 1995). When public 
health is present in our model, however, social security increases public health spending 
per worker by increasing output per worker (and hence life expectancy as well) for any 
given positive tax rate for public health spending, if the taste for the welfare of children is 
not weaker than the taste for the number of children. The positive effect of social security 
on public health spending per worker, and hence on life expectancy, works through the 
negative effect of social security on fertility and the positive effect on capital intensity in 
Proposition 2 for any positive tax rate for public health 0
M   . With higher public health 
spending per worker, life expectancy increases. The increases in public health spending 
and life expectancy driven by social security lead to lower ratios of middle-age and old-
age consumption to income according to equations (17) and (20). Intuitively, higher life 
expectancy induces a shift from middle-age consumption to either savings or bequests 
and reduces annuity incomes for old-age consumption to income.   
There exist both direct and indirect effects of a rise in the tax rate for public health 
on public health spending per worker. The direct effect is simple: when the tax rate for 
public health increases, so does public health spending per worker increases, given any 
fertility level. The indirect effect of a rise in the tax rate for public health on public health 
spending per worker works through its effect on fertility. As shown in Proposition 2, if  
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the taste for the welfare of children,  , is not weaker than the taste for the number of 
children, , and if the productivity parameter,  A, is large enough , then a rise in the tax 
rate for public health reduces fertility and hence, increases output per worker and public 
health spending per worker. Since both the direct and indirect effects of a rise in the tax 
rate for public health increase public health spending per worker under   and for a 
large enough  A, life expectancy increases. As a consequence, a rise in the tax rate for 
public health leads to lower ratios of middle-age consumption and old-age consumption 
to income according to equations (17) and (20) for    and large enough  A.  
  We now compare the magnitude of the effects of a tax rise for social security on 
fertility, capital per worker and output per worker with those of a tax rise for public 
health.     
 
Proposition 4. Let us start from zero taxes. If    , then the decrease in fertility due to 
an increase in the tax rate for unfunded social security, 
T  , is larger than that due to an 
equal increase in the tax rate for public health, 
M  , at the margin. At the same time, the 
increase in capital per worker and output per worker due to an increase in the tax rate 
for unfunded social security, 
T  , is higher than the counterpart due to an equal increase 
in the tax rate for public health, 
M  , at the margin.  
 
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix A.  
 
According to Proposition 4, if the taste for the welfare of children is not weaker 
than the taste for the number of children,  , and if the productivity parameter,  A, is 
large enough,  then social security has stronger negative effects on fertility and stronger 
positive effects on both capital and output per worker than public health does, starting 
with zero taxes. This implies that a rise in the tax rate for social security may be more 
effective in reducing fertility and increasing both capital and output per worker than that 
for public health even starting at higher tax rates. The intuition is that a tax rise for social 
security engenders an additional cost component of a child in terms of forgone social 
security benefits of spending time rearing a child in equation (15), compared to a tax rise  
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for public health. Therefore, social security exerts larger effects on fertility, capital per 
worker and output per worker than public health. The task next is to investigate how 
social  security  and  public  health  affect  welfare  numerically  with  endogenous  life 
expectancy and fertility.  
 
3.1.2. Welfare implications of social security and public health through simulations  
Due to the complexity of tracking down the full dynamic path for a complete welfare 
analysis in this complicated model, we only focus on the steady state for the welfare 
analysis.  Such  a  steady-state  welfare  analysis  yields  results  corresponding  to  what  is 
coined  as  the  "modified  golden  rule  of  capital  accumulation"  in  the  conventional 
neoclassical growth model. At the steady state, the welfare level V  in (1) is given as 
follows: 
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where   , , , c Y p n   are at their respective steady state levels and are functions of 
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  We now investigate the optimal tax rates of social security and public health at the 
steady state. We first differentiate the welfare function in (21) with respect to the tax rate 
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The  above  first-order  conditions  implicitly  determine  the  optimal  tax  rates  of  social 
security and public health (see Figure 1 for a numerical illustration). We next explore the 
implications  for  welfare  in  equation  (21)  using  a  numerical  approach  for  plausible 
parameterizations. 
The values of parameters are either in  line  with  those in  the literature if any 
(e.g., 0.65   ,  0.25   ), or they are chosen to yield plausible values for fertility and the 
survival  probability  to  old-age  (e.g.  0.1 v ,  0.5   ,  0.5   , 0 0.95 a  ,  1 0.45 a  , 
2 0.9 a  , and  25 A  ). Also, we set a low value for  at 0.01, measuring the degree of 
the  externality,  which  can  generate  realistic  values  for  the  tax  rates.  We  later  will 




examine whether the existence of positive investment externalities is essential for social 
security or public health to improve welfare by setting   at zero.  
  The  numerical  results  show  that  the  optimal  tax  rates  for  social  security  and 
public health together are ( , ) (0.21,0.09)
TM    as reported in Case 1 in Table 1 under 
the conditions    and  A is large enough such that higher tax rates for social security 
and  public  health  reduce  fertility.  Given  the  parameterization,  we  can  compare  the 
impacts of a tax rise for social security or public health on fertility, the ratio of middle-
age consumption to income, the ratio of old-age consumption to income, the provision of 
public health per worker, life expectancy, capital per worker, output per worker and the 
welfare level in cases with or without social security or public health in Table 1. Case 2 
of Table 1 reports the numerical results when both social security and public health are 
absent. Case 3 reports the effect of social security when public health is absent. Case 4 
reports  the  effect  of  public  health  when  social  security  is  absent.  Case  5  reports  the 
effects of social security and public health when their tax rates are equal. Finally, Case 6 
provides the effect of social security when the tax rate for public health is held constant. 
[Table 1 goes here.] 
 
Using Case 2 as a benchmark for comparisons, Table 1 illustrates Proposition 2 in 
that a rise in the tax rate for social security or public health reduces fertility and raises 
both capital and output per worker when the parameterizations satisfy    and a large 
enough productivity parameter,  A.
7 In Case 3, when public health is absent, a rise in the 
tax rate for social security has no effect on the provision of public health per worker, life 
expectancy,  the ratio of middle -age consumption to income   and the ratio of old-age 
consumption to income. This special case is in line with the existing literature on social 
security with exogenous longevity (e.g. Zhang, 1995, Yew and Zhang, 2009).  However, 
as shown in Case 6, a rise in the tax rate for social security raises the provision of public 
health per worker and life expectancy but reduces the ratio of middle-age consumption to 
income and the ratio of old -age consumption to income when the tax rate for  public 
health is positive and held constant. On the other hand, in Case 4 a rise in the tax rate for 
                                                 
7 The numerical results are also true qualitatively for the case     and therefore, we only focus on the 
case   for simplicity.   
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public health raises the provision of public health per worker and life expectancy but 
reduces  the  ratio  of  middle-age  consumption  to  income  and  the  ratio  of  old-age 
consumption to income. These results are consistent with Proposition 3. 
Comparisons for capital per worker across Case 2, Case 3, Case 4 and Case 5 
reflect Propositions 2 and 4. For instance, when( , ) (0,0)
TM   , capital per worker is 
1.188;  but  when  public  health  is  present  at  ( , ) (0,0.1)
TM   ,  capital  per  worker 
increases  to  1.257.  On  the  other  hand,  when  only  social  security  is  present  at 
( , ) (0.1,0)
TM   , capital per worker increases to a higher level at 1.431. Hence, when 
both social programs are present at ( , ) (0.1,0.1)
TM   , capital per worker is even higher 
at 1.572. These results show that the increase in capital per worker (and thus, output per 
worker) due to increases in both tax rates, 
T   and 
M  , are higher than the increase in 
capital per worker (and hence, output per worker) due to an increase in only one of these 
two tax rates. This is implied by Proposition 2. 
By comparing fertility across Case 2, Case 3 and Case 4 in Table 1, it is also 
obvious that the decrease in fertility from 2.796 to 2.509 when the tax rate for social 
security  increases  from  ( , ) (0,0)
TM    to  ( , ) (0.1,0)
TM    is  much  larger  than  the 
decrease in fertility from 2.796 to 2.707 when the tax rate for public health increases 
from ( , ) (0,0)
TM    to ( , ) (0,0.1)
TM   . As a consequence, the increase in capital per 
worker or output per worker due to an increase in the tax rate for social security is higher 
than that due to the same amount of increase in the tax rate for public health. These 
results therefore reflect Proposition 4. 
The  simulation  results  also  indicate  that  social  security  or  public  health  can 
increase welfare by reducing fertility and raising capital per worker and longevity. When 
both social security and public health are absent as in Case 2, the benchmark welfare 
level is 10.998 in Table 1. By scaling up both social security and public health, welfare 
increases  until  it  reaches  the  maximum  at  11.611  at  the  optimal  tax  rates 
( , ) (0.21,0.09)
TM   . The maximum of welfare in this case is higher than the maximum 
welfare in all other cases in Table 1. This implies that it is more efficient when both 
social security and public health are implemented together than they are implemented 
separately. The optimal per worker public expenditure on health, M , at 1.668 is about  
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6% of the corresponding output per worker at 25.856. The optimal public expenditure on 
health at 6% of output and the optimal tax rate for social security at 21% are close to the 
observed rates in industrial nations. According to the World Health Statistics (2009), 
public expenditure on health may attain as high as 8% of income,  and according to 
Social  Security  Administration  and  International  Social  Security  Association  (2006, 
2008), payroll tax rates for social security may range from 10% to 20% or higher.  
  In Table 2, we examine whether the simulation results concerning the optimal tax 
rates for social security and public health are sensitive to variations in the parameters 
( 0 1 2 , , , , , , , , a a a A v     ) and to the existence of investment externalities by varying   
from positive values to zero.
8 In doing so, we consider variations in one parameter at a 
time, starting from the parameterization in Table 1. First, a higher value of the taste for 
the welfare of children (  ) yields a lower optimal tax rate of social security and the 
magnitude of the change in the optimal tax rate is large. This is because the more parents 
value their children’s welfare than the number of children, the smaller the efficiency loss 
of  the  investment  externalities  for  a  given  degree  of  investment  externality  ( )  and 
therefore, the lower the optimal social security.
9  
  Second, a larger share parameter of capital ( ) leads to a higher optimal tax rate 
of social security and the magnitudes of the changes in the optimal tax rate are large as 
well. The reason for this result is that this share parameter measures the role of physical 
capital investment in the accumulation of physical capital. That is, with a larger share 
parameter , physical capital investment becomes more important in the production of 
output and therefore the efficiency loss of the physical capital externality is larger for a 
given degree of investment externality ( ).  
  Third, a larger degree of investment externality also requires a higher optimal tax 
rate for social security due to a larger efficiency loss of the externality. Fourth, a higher 
value of the taste for the number of children () yields a higher optimal tax rate for 
                                                 
8 The  taste  for  the  number  of  children,  ,  and  the  taste  for  the  welfare  of  children,  ,  may  change 
overtime  due  to  cultural  changes,  government  policies  associated  with  children,  increases  in  women’s 
education attainment and labor participation rates. 
9 An investment externality causes an under -investment in capital and hence, over -reproduction of the 
population compare to their socially optimal levels, as a lower investment in capital reduces th e marginal 
product of labor and therefore, the opportunity cost of spending time rearing a child.  The reason is similar 
to that in Zhang and Zhang (2007) where survival is certain.  
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social security. This is because the more parents value the number of children relative to 
the welfare of children, the larger the efficiency loss of the investment externalities for a 
given degree of investment externality ( ) and therefore, the higher the optimal tax rate 
for social security. By contrast, variations in the other parameters produce relatively little 
changes  in  the  optimal  tax  rate  for  social  security  in  Table  2.  This  is  because  these 
parameters are less relevant for fertility and physical capital investment, which channel 
the efficiency loss of the physical capital externality, than ( , , , )     . 
Notice that the optimal tax rate of public health is insensitive to variations in the 
parameters ( 0 1 2 , , , , , , , , , a a a A v      ). This is because the optimal tax rate for public 
health depends on the effect of the provision of public health per worker on average life 
expectancy  which  is  taken  as  given  by  individuals  in  their optimization  problem. So 
public health represents another form of externality in determining longevity.  
 
[Table 2 goes here.] 
 
Given the longevity externality, the investment externality is no longer essential 
for optimal policies. For example, when the investment externliaty is absent ( =0), the 
optimal  tax  rates for  social  security  and public  health  are  still  positive.  This  feature 
differs from Zhang and Zhang (2007) and Yew and Zhang (2009) where the optimal 
social security tax rate should be zero without the externality in production or education. 
 
3.2. Analysis of the equilibrium solution using linearization 
The  model  is  complex  and  is  non-linear,  which,  in  turn,  makes  it  difficult,  if  not 
impossible, to solve analytically. To deal with this problem, we will use the linearization 
approach  to  find  a  linear  approximation  to  the  dynamic  system.  Let  us  define 
ˆ log( / ) tt x x x   ,  where  x  is  the  steady  state  value.  We  first  linearize  the  budget 
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                    
                     
. 
Since the budget  constraints  and the  first-order conditions  are linear now, we 
conjecture a linear decision rule for each of these economic variables  1 ˆ
t b  ,  ˆt s ,  ˆt n  as a 
function of  variables  ˆ
t b ,  1 ˆt s  ,  1 ˆt n  . The difference equation system can be written as 
follows:  
















































Our  task  now  is  to  solve  for  the  undetermined  coefficients  in  the  matrix  Z .  As  the 
linearized model is still very complicated, we solve for the undetermined coefficients 
numerically using the parameterization and the optimal tax rates for social security and 












In  order  to  investigate  the  dynamic  properties  of  the  model  (i.e.,  whether  the 
economic  variables 1 ˆ
t b  ,  ˆt s ,  ˆt n ,  converge  and  whether  the  equilibrium  is  unique  and 
stable),  we  now  solve  for  eigenvalues  of  the  matrix  Z .  By  solving  the  following 
characteristic equation:   
23 0 0.006 0.071 0.720 0 ZI             ,   
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where I  is the identity matrix, we obtain eigenvalues  1 2 3 0.194, 0.580, 0.054        . 
Since  all  eigenvalues  are  smaller  than  one  in  absolute  value,  the  dynamic  system  is 
stationary and the equilibrium exists. Moreover, as the number of economic restrictions 
on the initial conditions in our model is three, i.e.,  1 1 0 ˆ ˆˆ ,, s n b  , and is equal to the number 
of eigenvalues less than one in absolute value, there exists a unique convergent path 
leading to the steady state in the dynamic system (see Krusell, 2004, p. 43).  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined the implications of PAYG social security and public 
health for fertility, life expectancy, capital per worker, output per worker and welfare in a 
dynastic model with altruistic bequests, endogenous longevity, and endogenous fertility. 
We have shown analytically that if the taste for the welfare of children is not weaker than 
that for the number of children, scaling up social security reduces fertility, but raises 
capital  per  worker,  output  per  worker,  public  health  spending  per  worker  and  life 
expectancy. We have also shown analytically that if the taste for the welfare of children is 
not weaker than that for the number of children and the productivity parameter is large 
enough, scaling up public health reduces fertility, but raises capital per worker, output per 
worker, public health spending per worker  and life expectancy. A comparison of tax 
policies between social security and public health shows that social security may be more 
effective than public health in reducing fertility and raising both capital and output per 
worker.  This  is  because  a  tax  rise  for  social  security  engenders  an  additional  cost 
component of a child in terms of forgone social security benefits of spending time rearing 
a child compared to a tax rise for public health. However, without the implementation of 
the public health program at the same time (as in the existing literature), social security 
has no effect on public health spending per worker and life expectancy.  
  Our simulation results highlight that scaling up social security or public health 
improves welfare by reducing fertility and raising longevity and capital intensity in the 
presence of an investment externality or a longevity externality. Though social security 
and public health can be used separately to increase welfare, our simulation results show 
that the maximum welfare is reached when both social security and public health are 
implemented optimally together. It is also worth mentioning that investment externality is  
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no longer necessary in our model to justify positive optimal tax rates for social security 
and  public  health  when  these  social  programs  improve  life  expectancy,  and  hence, 
welfare, via the longevity externality. Quantitatively, our model can generate the optimal 
tax rate of social security at 21% and optimal per worker public expenditure on health at 
6% of output per worker at the same time. These optimal rates obtained jointly in this 
model are close to the observed rates for social security and for public expenditure on 
health as a percentage of output in industrial nations.  
  The combination of such important factors as altruistic intergenerational transfers, 
and endogenous life expectancy and fertility has not been used together in exploring the 
implications  of  PAYG  social  security  and  public  health  for  fertility,  life  expectancy, 
capital per worker, output per worker and welfare, to the best of our knowledge. With 
these factors, our model has engendered some new insights. Our results may have useful 
policy implications. For instance, adopting both PAYG social security and public health 
may be appropriate for developing economies with high fertility, low life expectancy, and 
low levels of capital per worker and output per worker. Furthermore, our results may help 
explain the recent  behavior of fertility and life expectancy,  and the recent  pattern of 
spending on social security and public health in developed countries. Our results also 
help to explain the popularity of PAYG social security and public health in developed 






Proof  of  Proposition  2.  First,  we  substitute 
2 ( , )
01 ( , ) /
TM aM TM p a a e
    into  the 
equation  for  fertility  in  (19)  to  obtain  / nd n n n   as  given  in  equation  (23).  We  then 
differentiate  / nd n n n   in (23) with respect to 
T   and obtain  
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Note that  2  > 0 if  1 (1 )
TM          > 0 which is true if   . Using the transformed 
budget  constraint  in  equations  (11)  and  (13),  we  obtain 
  ( )/ 1 /(1 )
TM
cb              . In addition, with positive fertility, the fertility 
equation  in  (15)  implies  cb     .  Thus,  if    , 
  ( )/ 1 /(1 ) 0
TM
cb                and  (1 )(1 ) 0
TM            .  The 
condition  (1 )(1 ) 0
TM             implies (1 )
TM    >  0  which  leads  to 
1 (1 )
TM          > 0 and thus,  2  > 0. 
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  Therefore, if  , then /
T n  <0 in equation (25). By equations (5), (7), and 
(13), 
1 1/[1 ( )] [ (1 ) / ] K A vn n
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    in  the  steady  state,  and  hence  if    , 
then / ( / )( / ) 0
TT K K n n          .    By  equation  (4), 
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Similarly, by differentiating  / nd n n n   in (23) with respect to 
M  , we obtain 
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It  is  obvious  that    /0
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By using the equation for M in (30) and  1   in (26), expression (29) can be rewritten as: 
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aM M aM        is a decreasing function of M  when M  is large enough: 
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10  By  holding  all  other  factors  constant  in  (30),  public  health,  M ,  increases  as  the  productivity 
parameter, A , increases, since  M is positively related to the productivity parameter,  A .  
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Hence,  when  M  is  large  enough  due  to  a  large  enough  A ,  ceteris  paribus, 
 
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By Proposition 2, if   , then /
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By Proposition 2, if    and  A is large enough, then /0
M n      and hence, 
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d      by equations (17) and (20).   
 
Proof of Proposition 4. Proposition 2 implies that if    and  A is large enough, then 
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T T M M
K K n K K n
nn    
     
  
     
, 
starting at  0.
MT      
    By  substituting 
1 1/[1 ( )] [ (1 ) / ] K A vn n
   
    into
1 (1 ) Y AK vn




1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) (1 ) Y A n vn
   
        
 
           
and obviously,  /0 Yn    . Therefore, we have 
  T T M M
Y Y n Y Y n
nn    
     
  
     
 ,  
starting at 0.
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Table 1 Simulation results with the condition    
Parameterization: 
0 1 2 0.95, 0.45, 0.9, 0.65, 0.5, 0.25, 0.5, 0.01, 25, 0.1 a a a A v                 
  n   c    d    M   p   K   Y   V  
1. Optimal rates                 
0.21
T   , 
0.09
M     1.964  0.623  0.312  1.668  0.850  2.139     
 
 
25.856  11.611 
                 
2.  0
TM     2.796  0.806  0.403  0.000  0.500  1.188 
 
20.443  10.998 
                 
3. 0, 0
TM                    
0.1
T     2.509  0.806 
 
0.403  0.000  0.500  1.431 
 
22.097  11.043 
0.3




0.403  0.000  0.500  2.511 
 
27.430  11.074 
0.4




0.403  0.000  0.500  4.063 
 
32.432  11.000 
                 
4. 0, 0
MT                    
0.05
M     2.754  0.684  0.342  0.775  0.726  1.220 
 
20.675  11.425 
0.1
M     2.707  0.617  0.309  1.570  0.841  1.257 
 
20.939  11.522 
0.15
M     2.653  0.572  0.286  2.390  0.898  1.301 
 
21.245  11.455 
                 
5.  0




TM     2.606  0.682  0.341  0.807  0.732  1.342 
 
21.519  11.460 
0.1
TM    2.372  0.613  0.307  1.721  0.854  1.572 
 
22.952  11.580 
0.2
TM    1.703  0.532  0.266  4.212  0.940  2.679 
 
28.080  11.271 
 
6. 0
T   , 
    0.05




T     2.445  0.680  0.340  0.843  0.739  1.495 
 
22.491  11.492 
0.2
T     2.080  0.674  0.337  0.936  0.756  1.951 
 
24.972  11.540 
0.3
T     1.643  0.667  0.334  1.074  0.779  2.834 
 
28.648  11.539  
 
39 
Table 2 Simulated optimal tax rates: sensitivity analysis 
 
Parameter 
T   
M   
Varying       
 =0.6  0.26  0.09 
 =0.7  0.17  0.09 
Varying       
  =0  0.18  0.09 
  =0.02  0.24  0.08 
Varying      
 =0.45  0.19  0.08 
 =0.55  0.23  0.09 
Varying       
  =0.2  0.16  0.09 
  =0.3  0.26  0.08 
Varying       
  =0.45  0.22  0.08 
  =0.55  0.20  0.09 
Varying  0 a      
0 a =0.9  0.21  0.09 
0 a =1  0.21  0.09 
Varying  1 a      
1 a =0.4  0.21  0.08 
1 a =0.5  0.21  0.09 
Varying  2 a      
2 a =0.85  0.21  0.09 
2 a =0.95  0.20  0.09 
Varying  A     
A=20  0.21  0.09 
A=30  0.20  0.09 
Varying v     
v =0.05  0.22  0.11 





Figure 1 Welfare with social security and public health 
 












T   is  1 x - axis, 
M  is  2 x - axis, and welfare is  3 x - axis. 
The welfare level refers to equation (21) with parameterization in Table 1. 
 